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Sinister Translations: Law's Authority in a
Post-9/11 World
JOTHIE RAJAH*
ABSTRACT

What does the killing and burial of bin Laden tell us about the sites,
sources, and nature of law's authority in a post-'9/11' world?1 If law is
constituted by "actsof language [that] are actions in the world,'2 then the
law embodied by these events is discernible through an analysis of
Obama's announcement on the killing of bin Laden. Obama's
announcement avoids the term 'law' yet makes present the relationship
between 'law,' justice,' legitimacy, and violence. Through critical theory
on language, translation, and political myth, this paper explores the
translations at work in constructing law's authority for a post-9/11
world.
INTRODUCTION

A. Embodying Law's Authority
Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Special Forces in his home in
Pakistan on May 1, 2011 and later buried at sea. His killing, as signified
* Jothie Rajah is Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation, Chicago. She
holds a Ph.D in Law from Melbourne Law School and is the author of AuthoritarianRule
of Law: Legislation, Discourse and Legitimacy in Singapore (2012). For generous advice,
probing questions, and encouragement that helped transform ideological and intellectual
distress into a research project, the author is especially grateful to Bonnie Honig. For
soldiering through a barely readable early draft, the author is deeply indebted to Susan
Shapiro. For thoughtful comments on various versions, the author warmly thanks Rick
Abel, Fred Aman, Andrea Ballestero, Carolyn Bernstein, Colin Ford, Terry Halliday, Iza
Hussin, Eve Lester, Joe Margulies, Amy Myrick, Matthew Nicholson, Pooja Parmar,
Angela Spinazze, Umut Turem, and Peer Zumbansen. Amy Myrick has been an invaluable
research assistant.
1. In (at least) the instance of first use, I place the term 'law' and other terms key to
the analysis of this argument (such as 'rule of law,' 'justice,' and '9/11') in single quotation
marks to visually signify that I problematize these terms as constructs and categories.
2. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSIATION, at ix (1990).
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by the secretive burial at sea and the 1:00 a.m. raid on his home, is
shrouded. Enacted in darkness, with the material reality of his body
annihilated when slipped into unmarkable spaces, 3 it is as if the killing
of this man is beyond the reach of 'law': beyond capture, trial,
sentencing, and most potently, beyond a burial that acknowledged his
(human) ties to kin and community. This was a killing that enacted the
power to not just take life, but to take death.4 The burial at sea is surely
emblematic of an approach to counterinsurgency "predicated on
eradicatingthe identity and existence of the Other, not just controlling
the illicit use of violence."5
What does the killing and burial of bin Laden tell us about the sites,
sources, and nature of law's authority in a post-'9/11' world?6 If law is
regarded as more than positive rules, if law is "the creation of a world of
meaning"7 constituted by "acts of language [that] are actions in the
world,"8 then the killing and burial of bin Laden are rule making and
norm shaping. As Margaret Davies explains,
we think that there is some place that [knowledge]
comes from which is external to ourselves. . . . [A] gainst
this I would like to suggest . . . that there are no rules
out there . . . but that they exist only in reality, that is,

only because we live them, we continually create and
transform rules as we exist. There is no absolute place
where they are all fixed, and to which we can refer to
find their authentic form. Law is embodied, as we are,
3. The very materiality of dead bodies facilitates their political lives. See KATHERINE
VERDERY, THE POLITICAL LIVES OF DEAD BODIES: REBURIAL AND POSTSOCIALIST CHANGE
27 (1999) (a study of dead body politics in post-Communist Eastern Europe).
4. As Verdery notes, immense political symbolism attaches to death rituals and
beliefs, notions of the "proper burial," and national and international contexts relating to
particular dead bodies. VERDERY, supra note 3, at 3. The dead bodies of the "named and
famous" have a heightened significance, and shaping the social visibility of a dead body is
part of the larger process of political transformation. See id. at 13-20.
5. Alison Brysk, Human Rights and National Insecurity, in NATIONAL INSECURITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEMOCRACIES DEBATE COUNTERTERRORISM 1, 5 (Alison Brysk &
Gershon Shafir eds., 2007) (emphasis added).
6. See GENERALLY RICHARD JACKSON, WRITING THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005)
(arguing that the rhetoric used after 9/11 has justified the war on terrorism). I use this
shorthand with some regret that it has become so convenient to use. Jackson warns of the
bundle of meanings and risks attached to the way in which the use of '9/11' works to
"erase the history and context of the events and turn their representation into a culturalpolitical icon where the meaning of the date becomes both assumed and open to
manipulation[,] ... [a] mythologising practice." Id. at 7.
7. WHITE, supranote 2, at ix.
8. White is elaborating upon Wittgenstein's "famous sentence" that "[t]o imagine a
language means to imagine a form of life." Id.
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and denying this is only a way of making life and law
easier by pretending that rules are an absolute
justification. 9
In short, this killing and burial are law. At the risk of belaboring the
point, if 'law' is embodied by the material and discursive reality of rules
we live, create, and transform, and we cannot imagine ourselves in
relation to 'law' outside of language,1 0 then the sites of 'law' are not
limited to courtrooms and legislatures. 'Law' is (also) enacted in the
mediatized public sphere. Thus, rather than looking to doctrinal law, I
explore the question of law's post-9/11 authority through an analysis of
a text legitimizing the killing: Obama's announcement on the killing of

bin Laden, Remarks by the Presidenton Osama bin Laden (hereinafter
the "Remarks," provided as Appendix A)."
As 'law,' the Remarks make present the relationship between 'law,'
'justice,' legitimacy, and violence; a relationship this paper explores
through critical theory on language and power and theory relating to
processes and dynamics of translation. However, before going further, I
should perhaps make explicit that this analysis is informed by a
normative position on the relationship between 'law' and 'justice' in
which 'law' is understood as the vehicle of an aspiration towards
'justice.' In her influential Just Silences, Mariane Constable traces a
range of ways in which law and justice relate inextricably to each other,
such that the contemporary dominance of legal positivism cannot,
through its silences on 'justice,' be understood as effecting erasures of
'justice.'12 Ironically, the text this paper centers on, the Remarks,
articulates the term that contemporary 'law' typically silences'justice'-even as it is silent as to (an explicit) 'law.' Prising open the
meanings the Remarks construct for justice,' and for an absent but still

9. MARGARET DAVIES, ASKING THE LAW QUESTION 4 (1994).

10. There is a large body of literature arguing and demonstrating the impossibility of
thinking 'law' outside of 'language.' Some important references include MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE 215-237
(1972); WHITE, supra note 2; MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND
POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN LAW 14 (2005); ROBERT M. COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND

THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat
eds., 1995).
11. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Osama bin Laden, Address
in the East Room (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press[hereinafter Remarks by the
office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-osama-bin-laden
President]. A copy of the Remarks is appended at Appendix A, and any reference to the
Remarks without citation refers to Appendix A.
12. CONSTABLE, supranote 10.
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speaking 'law' and 'rule of law,' is the endeavor at the heart of this
paper.
In mapping the ways in which the Remarks do and do not use 'law,'
'justice,' and 'rule of law,' I have found the analytic lens of translation
invaluable because, as the discussion below elaborates, translation
brings within its conceptual grasp the primacy of affect in meaningmaking, and the manner in which modality and affect might relate to
normative and systemic continuities, discontinuities, and distortions.
Additionally, the thematic concern of this collection of papers with
regulatory translations highlights that although 'law,' 'justice,' and 'rule
of law' have regulatory force in national and transnational arenas, 13 and
regulation is a site in which the processes of translation are richly in
evidence, 14 the workings of translation in the regulatory field of 'rule of
law' discourse are just beginning to be explored.1 5 This paper's
deployment of the concept of translation helps illuminate some of the
law-making dynamics at work in the Remarks that may otherwise
escape analytic attention.
13. For some examples of the literature, see generally KAMARI MAXINE CLARKE,
FICTIONS OF JUSTICE (2009) (exploring the fraught question of legitimacy in sub-Saharan
Africa with regard to international criminal justice); LAW AND DISORDER IN THE
POSTCOLONY (Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff eds., 2006) (demonstrating that
postcolonies are interpellated by governance structures that, inter alia, criminalize
poverty and perpetuate corruption even as they fetishize law); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER (2007) (examining the politics, processes, and
ideology of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court); JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN
RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE (2012)
(demonstrating how the institutions, politics, and histories of 'rule of law' can be
disaggregated to simultaneously foster economic success but also civil and politic
repression); THE POWER OF LAW IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD (Franz von BendaBeckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann & Anne Griffiths eds., 2009) (examining how,
under conditions of legal pluralism and in a transnational world, social processes and
power effect the constitution and reconstitution of law); RONEN SHAMIR, THE COLONIES OF
LAW (2000) (analyzing the secular, nationalist, and anti-colonial ideology of the Hebrew
Law of Peace in British-ruled Palestine).
14. Andrea Ballestero & Umut Turem, Opening Remarks at the conference
"Regulatory Translations: Expertise and Affect in Global Legal Fields" (May 16-18, 2013),
organized by Bogazici University, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, and Rice
University.
15. For examples see generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER
VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006) (exploring the
tensions between elite global formulations of human rights law and grassroots responses);
ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
MARKETS (2011) (tracing the role of actors on the ground as de facto financial regulators);

AnnJanette Rosga, The Traffic in Children: The Funding of Translation and the
Translation of Funding, 28 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 258 (2005)
(exploring translation as an analytic concept and as a dynamic informing global
knowledge sharing on the trafficking of children).
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Briefly, I argue that the Remarks and its accompanying narrative
legitimize the killing by constructing an account of law's authority
through a bifurcated translationof notions of state legitimacy. Relying
first on James Boyd White's argument that translation is a process that
must engage with the affective primacy of gestural, social, and
relational meaning,1 6 and second, on Walter Benjamin's notion of
translation as mode,' 7 I argue that the Remarks deploy gestural, social,
and relational modalities of legitimacy that predate 9/11 to assert
continuing legitimacy for a mode of state power that, post-9/11,
represents a normative and institutional rupture. This rupture resides
in a fresh uncoupling of 'law' and justice'; an uncoupling that inverts
legal positivism's loquacious 'law' and silent 'justice' 8 to instead silence
'law' while celebrating a 'justice' embedded in political myths of 'nation.'
The second limb of this bifurcated translation relates to the
extensive invocation of affect, and, in particular, the affect of
significance generated by political myth, 19 as the legitimizing
foundation for an account of 'justice' that needs no reference to the
processes, institutions, and actors of 'law.' It is in this regard that the
translation becomes sinister: modes of signifying legitimacy drawn from
pre-9/11 (gestural, social, and relational) texts are retained even as
norms, values, and systems are rescripted for a post-9/11 world.
This bifurcated translation is rendered seamless and whole by the
womb-like familiarity of political myth's affect, 20 such that generally
unexamined beliefs about the exceptionalism and ascendancy of the
United States as 'nation' become an alternative to 'law'-in its
conventionally understood institutional and procedural presences-as a
foundation for state authority. If, before 9/11, state legitimacy resided in
a law understood as restraints on state power, 21 and more explicitly in
16. WHITE, supra note 2, at 233.
17. See WALTER BENJAMIN, THE TASK OF THE TRANSLATOR (Harry Zohn trans., 1968)
(1923), reprinted in THE TRANSLATION STUDIES READER 15, 16 (Lawrence Venuti ed.,
Taylor & Francis e-Library ed. 2004) (2000).
18. See generally CONSTABLE, supranote 10.
19. See CHIARA BOITICI, A PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL MYTH 116-133 (2007) (theorizing
the forces that move people to act on the basis of arational elements).
20. Key components of political myth that allow it to "bypass critical scrutiny" are
invisibility, ubiquity, and a powerful grip on our psyches. Joanne Esch, Legitimizing the

"War on Terror" Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric, 31 POL. PSYCHOL. 357, 360
(2010).
21. For some useful succinct reviews and analysis in the extensive literature on law,
politics, and legitimacy, see David Clark, The Many Meanings of the Rule of Law, in LAW,
CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 28, 29-31
(Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999); MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS (2000); BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 114-126 (2004).
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visible legal institutions, processes, and actors (such as judicial
proceedings conducted in the public domain), 22 then post-9/11, the
translation effected by the Remarks locates 'justice' in spaces and
practices apart from 'law.' In short, in an abandonment vividly enacted
through the absence of the term 'law,' the Remarks discard 'law' as a
basis for state legitimacy.
In contrast to a discarded law, 'justice' is enlivened by the Remarks'
narrative of bin Laden's culpability in perpetrating an extreme violence
that has caused the American people extreme grief and trauma. The
Remarks present counterterrorism, intelligence, and military personnel
as a new cast of determined and heroic justice actors, able to shift the
nation away from grief and trauma and toward the victory of killing bin
Laden. In so doing, these new justice actors enact the greatness of the
United States as nation and repair the trauma of 9/11. The killing
becomes emblematic of justice as a redemptive and retributive felt
substitute for law. 23 In this way, the Remarks effect a troubling
translation of state authority away from 'law' toward a 'justice' that
relies on affect, entrenched political myths of U.S. identity, and a mode
of translation that bifurcates texts of legitimacy to reconfigure the
grounds of law's authority in a post-9/11 world.

B. From No Law to Lots of Law
Two years after the killing of bin Laden, President Obama delivered
a major policy speech calling for the United States to conduct itself in a
manner that upholds the rule of law when addressing terrorism

(Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, hereafter
the Drone Policy Speech). 24 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
fully engage with the Drone Policy Speech, it is important to highlight
that in the Drone Policy Speech, the word 'justice' is sparingly used, but
'law' and 'rule of law' feature prominently, and repeated reference is
made to the need for, and importance of, institutions, actors, and
22. But see JOSEPH MARGULIES, WHAT CHANGED WHEN EVERYTHING CHANGED: 9/11
AND THE MAKING OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 91-111 (2013), in which Margulies argues that,
from 1963 to 2013, "the idea of the rule of law has changed from a restraint on the state
(in order to protect individual liberty) into a weapon of the state (in order to enable the
state to identify, seize, imprison, and punish those who threaten a blameless 'us')," id. at
91 (emphasis in original).
23. See THANE ROSENBAUM, PAYBACK: THE CASE FOR REVENGE 1-2 (2013), for the
troubling argument that 'justice' is equivalent to "revenge." The killing of bin Laden is one
of the instances of an indistinguishable justice/revenge considered by Rosenbaum. Id. at 8.
24. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/
05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university [hereinafter Drone Policy Speech].
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processes associated with 'rule of law.' When juxtaposed, the absent
'law' of the Remarks and the hyper-present 'law' of the Drone Policy
Speech surely add up to a recognition that the killing and burial of bin
Laden have significantly undermined law's authority in a post-9/11
world. 25
The Drone Policy Speech has called for a range of measures that
may or may not repair some of law's damaged authority. 26 However, the
Drone Policy Speech cannot undo the law embodied by the Remarks and
the killing and burial of bin Laden. By being alert to the manner in
which translation has been at work in rendering the 'law' of this killing,
the Remarks will help us to see these processes at work in continuing
reformulations of 'law,' 'justice,' and 'rule of law,' and, hopefully, better
equip us to penetrate accounts of law, justice, and rule of law so as to
facilitate critical engagement and social action.
I. TRANSLATING LAW: MISRULE, MODE, AND AFFECT
A. Translationas Misrule
In its common-sense understanding, 27 translation happens when an
expert, fluent in at least two languages, works with a text originally
authored in one language to render that text into another. 28 In other

25. However, by marking the killing of bin Laden as a necessary and lawful exception,
this speech leaves open the possibility that when symbolic politics are at stake, 'law' may
be discarded for a 'justice' grounded in affect.
26. For example,
America's legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the
discussion. To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to
say it is wise or moral in every instance. For the same human progress
that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands
the discipline to constrain that power-or risk abusing it. And that's
why, over the last four years, my administration has worked
vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force
against terrorists-insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and
accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance that
I signed yesterday.
Drone Policy Speech, supra note 24.
27. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines "translation" as "the process of
changing something that is written or spoken into another language." Translation
Definition, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER'S DICTIONARY, http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdiction
aries.com/dictionary/translation (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
28. This understanding of translation is consistent with an "instrumental concept of
language, which sees it as a mode of communication of objective information." Paula G.
Rubel & Abraham Rosman, Introduction: Translationand Anthropology, in TRANSLATING
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words, "translation" signifies the processes, expertise, and product that
effects communication by bridging difference. 29 However, when
difference centers on conceptions of legitimacy and the legitimate
foundations of authority, a less benign dynamic of translation may be at
work. 30 Homi Bhabha has argued that in the colonial encounter,
translation has participated in, and operated as, conquest.3 1 Translation
works as conquest when cultures are required to "revise their own
systems of reference, norms and values, by departing from their
habitual . . . rules of transformation." 32 In other words, in contexts of
domination and subordination, translation has been deployed to explore
and conquer the spaces of epistemological difference. 33 In this paper, I
argue that the Remarks represent a moment of normative translation
analogous to the colonial conquest of epistemology; a process Bhabha
has characterized as "the misrule of cultural translation."34 If the
misrule of cultural translation is marked by departures and revisionsdepartures from habitual rules of transformation through revisions of
systems of reference, norms, and values 3 5-then, in the departure that
is a discarded 'law' and the revision that is a reconfigured 'justice,' the
Remarks are akin to the translation as misrule that marks the colonial
encounter. 36
In this crucial regard, translation as misrule bears little
resemblance to the justice and translation that James Boyd White sees
as analogous. White's true subject is "the art of recognizing another and
respecting difference." 37 For White, both translation and justice are
"ways of establishing right relations, both between one person and
CULTURES: PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSLATION AND ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 6 (Paula G. Rubel &
Abraham Rosman eds., 2003).
29. See Naoki Sakai, Translation, 23 THEORY CULTURE & Soc'Y 71, 75 (2006)
(discussing translation as the negotiation of difference.).
30. See generally BERNARD S. COHN, COLONIALISM AND ITS FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE
BRITISH IN INDIA 4 (1996) (arguing that British study of Indian languages was important
to the colonial project of control and command).

31. Homi K. Bhabha, The Voice of the Dom: Retrieving the Experience of the OnceColonized, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (LONDON), Aug. 8, 1997, at 14, availableat Gale,
Doc. No. EX1200487824. I am grateful to Pooja Parmar for this important reference.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. See Susan Bassnett, Translating Terror, 26 THIRD WORLD Q. 393 (2005), for an
explanation of the manner in which entrenched ways of thinking of Central Asia as "a
cradle of savagery and anti-modernity" continue to shape the manner in which texts from
an Islamist website are translated. See also TEJASWINI NIRANJANA, SITING TRANSLATION:
HISTORY, POsT-STRUCTURALISM, AND THE COLONIAL CONTEXT (1992), for a discussion of
translation as a technology of colonial domination.
37. WHITE, supranote 2, at 230.
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another and between a mind and the language it confronts."3 8 In the
warm humanism39 and compositional beauty of White's invitation to
think and feel language and meaning through silence,40 and through
"the music the voices make, whether beautiful and harmonious or raw
and ugly,"4 1 there is little anticipation of the sinister instrumentality of
a translation directed at the misrule of epistemological conquest. 42
Despite this difference in underlying assumptions, White's acute
awareness of the other-than-lexical aspects of communication points us
to affect, gesture, sound, image, and feeling; tapping into what he calls
"a deep sea of competence,"4 3
intonation, cadence, texture ...

position of the body and

timbre of the voice . . .. For language has its roots not in

ideas but in social relations, and its deepest motives and
meaning are social still. Think of the baby in his
mother's arms: learning the language of her body, of her
tones of voice and touch and gesture, and teaching her
his . . . words and phrases .

.

. are late and relatively

minor stages in the development of his capacity to
understand and respond to another person. These words
float as it were on a deep sea of competence without
which they would be nothing at all .

.

.. [O]ur language

is at the deepest level the expression of a set of motives
and gestures we share with all mammals; its radical
meaning is social and relational. 44
White's deep sea of competence-gestural, social, relational-in
which words are but final, floating layers, is echoed by Anna Gibbs's
discussion of the cross-modal and sensory translation that takes place
between a mother and a nine-month old baby when a baby's delighted

38. Id.
39. See, e.g., id. at 232-33 ("[T]he understanding ... we sought . .. was to inhabit the
world of the other, to speak Spanish, or English, with the right intonation, cadence,
texture, with the right position of the body and timbre of the voice, to respond and be
responded to in a whole way. That sense of human reciprocity, of shared movements, is
where the deepest meaning lies.").
40. Id. at 34.
41. Id. at 231.
42. This is not to suggest that White is naive about the role of power relations in
translation; his chapter on the influence of "Chicago School" economics shows otherwise.
See id. at 46-86.
43. Id. at 233.
44. Id.
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squeal is mirrored by a mother's responsive shimmy.45 In other words,
affect is at the root of all communication; and the prelingual affective
communication, and cross-modal translations between infants and
parents, vividly illustrate White's conviction that affect is at the root of
all translation.
At this juncture, it may be useful to clarify that affect is
the name we give to those forces-visceral forces
beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious
knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion-that can
serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and
extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral)
across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or
that can leave us overwhelmed by the world's apparent
intractability. 46
In other words, affect, once understood as broadly equivalent to
'emotion,' has come, in contemporary scholarship, to be understood as
encompassing that which affects us, "a body's capacity to affect and to
be affected." 47
How does this expansive understanding of communication and
translation, with a heightened attention to affect, relate to translation
as misrule in the Remarks? In the instance of the Remarks, with
neither the wordless cross-modal translation of infant-parent
communication, nor the conventional translation marked by difference
in 'language' or 'culture,' 48 the work of translation is not immediately
evident. In an effort to better grasp at the significance of the facets of
communication that White disaggregates for us-gesture, affect, the

45. Anna Gibbs, After Affect: Sympathy, Synchrony, and Mimetic Communication, in
THE AFFECT THEORY READER 186, 195 (Melissa Gregg & Gregory J. Seigworth eds., 2010)
("Daniel Stern describes how, when a nine-month-old girl becomes excited about a toy and
is able to grasp it, she 'lets out an exuberant "aah!" and looks at her mother. Her mother
looks back, scrunches up her shoulders, and performs a terrific shimmy with her upper
body . . . [that] is equally excited, joyful and intense' . . . . Stern's account of the mother's

cross-modal imitation-or translation-of the baby's squeal of delight into a dancing
shimmy corresponding with its length and rhythmic contour . . . makes clear . . . that

similarity is crucial, but so too is the difference produced in this sensory translation.").
46. Gregory J. Seigworth & Melissa Gregg, An Inventory of Shimmers, in THE AFFECT
THEORY READER, supra note 45, at 1, 1.
47. Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).
48. It is interesting to note that, "[o]nly recently has the term 'translation' been
reduced in the scope of its meaning in the Western World to refer only to the translation
from one language to another. Earlier, during the Renaissance, for example, it had many
more meanings, and a much fuller semiotic range." Rubel & Rosman, supra note 28, at 20.
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"position of the body and timbre of the voice"49-1
Benjamin's notion of translation as mode:

rely on Walter

Translation is a mode. To comprehend it as mode, one
must go back to the original, for that contains the law
governing the translation: its translatability. The
question of whether a work is translatable .

.

. [is]: Does

its nature lend itself to translation and, there, in view of
the significance of the mode, call for it? ...
Translatability is an essential quality of certain works . .
. it means ... that a specific significance inherent in the
original manifest itself in its translatability.5 0
If the Remarks are read as a text asserting the legitimacy of the
United States, then Benjamin's notion of translation as mode prompts
these questions: What is the (notionally original) 'work' or 'text' that the
Remarks translate? What is its nature, and what attributes of its
inherent specific significance are evident in the Remarks? In framing
these questions, I understand 'work' or 'text' to signify more than
documentary artifact. Instead, in keeping with White's deep sea of
competence, I understand the 'text' of state legitimacy to reside in the
mode of an ordered set of signs-including images and sounds 5 1 through which people understand the state to be legitimate.
My argument is straightforward: the work translated by the
Remarks is a text of legitimacy that taps into the deep sea of
competence that recognizes and responds to the visual, gestural, social,
and relational understanding that a state conducts itself legitimately
when a state presents itself in certain ways. A text of state legitimacy
surely resides in the modalities of declaratory statement, public gesture,
and the iconic images of state power. The pervasive understanding that
state legitimacy is located in public gesture and declaratory statement
comes to the forefront when contrasted with the shame, scandal, and
fractured legitimacy that has (perhaps until 9/11 ) attached to secrecy. 52
Indeed, it seems probable that the Remarks may represent the first
instance of the United States making a celebratory public declaration
49. WHITE, supra note 2, at 233.
50. BENJAMIN, supra note 17, at 16.
51. See Stephen P. Witte, Context, Text, Intertext: Toward a Constructivist Semiotic of
Writing, 9 WRITTEN COMM. 237, 269 (1992).
52. Perhaps, in the recent history of the US, the emblematic instance of fractured
legitimacy associated with the taint of secrecy is the Watergate scandal and the
consequent damage to the Nixon presidency.
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with reference to a killing that arguably occupies the sphere of
illegality. 53
B. Translationas Mode
Translation as mode (effecting the misrule of epistemological
conquest) is at work in the Remarks when iconic visual representations
of state legitimacy are deployed in the performance of public gesture
and when the tenor of the Remarks gravely celebrates a weighty
achievement. 54 For example, it is the individual who legitimately leads
the United States-the President-who delivers the Remarks, making
the announcement from a material space that visually signifies
centuries of U.S. state authority-the White House.

53. This Senate report clarifies that up to 1975, the U.S. had not admitted to
conducting extrajudicial killings. See generally SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, ALLEGED
ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. No. 94-465 (1975), available
at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94thl94465.pdf (covering allegations of United
States involvement in assassination plots against foreign political leaders). In the more
recent post-9/11 climate, prior to the killing of bin Laden, information on extrajudicial
killings appears to have entered the public domain through leaks and comments from
officials not authorized to speak. These news reports on killings in Yemen and Somalia are
typical of the government's tendency to minimize publicity and links to state authority.

See, e.g., Steve Bloomfield, Somalia: The World's Forgotten Catastrophe, INDEP. (Feb. 9,
2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/worldlafricalsomalia-the-worlds-forgotten-catas

trophe-778225.html; Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: the Battlefield; U.S. Would Use
Drones to Attack Iraqi Targets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/
11/06/world/threats-responses-battlefield-us-would-use-drones-attack-iraqi-targets.html.
After 9/11, the U.S. has argued that extrajudicial killings, now somewhat euphemistically
called "targeted killings," are permissible in military operations and self-defense. See
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A /HRC/14/24/Add.6, 27-28 (May 28,
2010) (by Philip Alston). In February 2013, a leaked Department of Justice White Paper
revealed the Obama administration's legal justification for drone attacks on U.S. citizens.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen
Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or an Associated Force 1, available at
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/ilmsnbc/sections/news/020413 DOJ White_.Paper.pdf. In May
2013, the Obama administration acknowledge that drones had killed four U.S. citizens.

See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The Audacity of Eric Holder's Letter Admitting Team Obama
Killed 4 Americans, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politicslarchive/

2013/05/the-audacity-of-eric-holders-letter-admitting-team-obama-killed-4americans/276145/.
54. See Obama- Osama bin Laden Dead - Full Video, YOUTUBE (May 1, 2011),

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-m-N3dJvhgPg, for the full video clip.

SINISTER TRANSLATIONS

119

The room from which Obama speaks is richly furnished.55 There is a
pleasing symmetry in the twin lamps that flank the highly polished
wood of the doors at the end of the corridor.5 6 An ornate chandelier casts
a soft, golden light over all we see, reflecting off marble floors and
walls.5 7 Associations with royalty are evoked by the red of Obama's tie,
the red upholstery of the two gilded chairs in the frame, and the red of
the carpet-all of which appear to be an identical shade of red, adding to
the visual harmony of what we see.
Not only is red a color with particular affective potency,58 but the
red of the carpet appears especially rich, especially royal, because it has
a border of gold. And when the camera dwells on Obama's confident
stride down the carpeted corridor, the plush richness of the carpet is
also conveyed by the pin-drop silence that accompanies Obama's steps.
In the silence that is broken only by Obama's voice, in the symmetries,
the colors, and the rich beauty and golden light, there is the sense of a
power that (apparently effortlessly) controls the world; this power
produces an order and a sensibility in keeping with deeply entrenched
understandings of power and prestige. (The control and order of the
Remarks, in particular the depth of the silence that accompanies
Obama's walk down the carpeted corridor to the lectern, are in stark
contrast to the probable visual and aural chaos of the raid on bin
Laden's compound).
Translation as mode is also at work in the manner in which Obama
is presented. Although it was almost midnight at the time the Remarks
were recorded, Obama looks impeccable in his suit. He shows no signs of
the human need for sleep or of having performed as President and
Commander-in-Chief through an especially fraught and demanding day.
55. Although the White House announcement states that the Remarks were delivered
in the East Room, Macon Phillips, Osama Bin Laden Dead, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May
02, 2011, 12:16 AM), http://www.whitehouse.govblog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead,
the chandeliers and furniture suggest that the location of the recording was the Cross
Hall, see The Art & Dicor of the White House: Public Tour by Room, http://www.white
house.gov/about/inside-white-house/rooms (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) (under "State Floor,"
select "Cross Hall").
56. It is probable that these lamps are those described on the White House website as
the bronze light standards that date from the Roosevelt renovation of 1902. See Cross
Hall, THE WHITE HOUSE MUSEUM, http://www.whitehousemuseum.org/floorl/cross-hall.
htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
57. In The Cross Hall, the marble walls and floors were added during the Truman
renovation. The two Adam-style cut-glass chandeliers were made in London in about 1775.
Id.
58. See Lone Bertelsen & Andrew Murphie, An Ethics of Everyday Infinities and
Powers: Filix Guattari on Affect and the Refrain, in THE AFFECT THEORY READER, supra

note 45, at 138, 138 (exploring the often unacknowledged centrality and power of affect in
theory and in everyday life).
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Echoing the political theology of the two bodies of the king,5 9 Obama as
President appears both mortal and more than mortal in his remarkable
(but composed) vitality. In what must be a meticulously staged and
carefully choreographed visual and aural presentation, both the
President and the room appear regal; the individual who is President
embodies a gravitas and certainty that surpasses human frailties, and
the room that stands for the state evokes associations with wealth,
power, and permanence.
To summarize, as a text of translation, the Remarks manifest the
"special significance inherent in the original,"6 0 relating to a range of
public, gestural modalities that convey state legitimacy. Translation as
mode illustrates the translatability of a text that vests state legitimacy
in the modalities of iconic images, public gesture, and celebratory
declarations. The misrule of this translation arises from a duplicity of
sorts: the mode of the 'original' text of state legitimacy is retained, but
the substance of that text is altered when (conventional, institutional,
and procedural) 'law' is discarded. In White's terms, the "intonation,
cadence, texture .

.

. position of the body and timbre of the voice" that

constitute a text of state legitimacy are retained, but the words that are
the final, floating layers of 'rule of law' restraints on state power are
absent.61 Even as the delivery of the Remarks rehearses and relies on an
'original' text of legitimacy, in its content, the Remarks script departures
from, and revisions of, systems of reference, norms, and values relating
to the parameters of state power. It is in these departures and revisions
that the translation as misrule unfolds.
II. INESCAPABLE LAW

A. Operationas Not Law
While an extensive and interdisciplinary critical scholarship has
turned away from narrowly positivist understandings of law to instead
conceptualize law as a discourse through which social and cultural
meanings and relations are enacted, at the same time, as much of this
popular,
and
received
notes,
dominant,
same
scholarship
understandings of law are overwhelmingly positivist, and legal

59. See generally ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES (1957) (tracing the
historical, political, and ideological complexities posed by the "King's two bodies"-the
body politic and the body natural).
60. BENJAMIN, supra note 17, at 254.
61. WHITE, supra note 2, at 233.
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education tends to perpetuate and emphasize a positivist model of law. 62
This distinction between the critical approach that informs my
argument, and received notions of law, becomes important with
reference to the Remarks and the events of the killing of bin Laden
because Obama does not use the word 'law.' Instead, the word 'justice'
features five times in the Remarks. Ironically, the nonappearance of law
as an explicit term is accompanied by a cluster of familiar legal
categories, including murder, terrorist, and innocence-terms through
which acts, events, experiences, and our relation to the world acquire
legal significance. In other words, even though an explicit 'law' is
absented, the orderingeffects of law are in evidence, demonstrating that
law functions as a scheme of interpretation. 63
It is therefore surely noteworthy that Obama uses the nonlegal term
"operation" to characterize the manner in which bin Laden was killed.64
The distance and dispassion of 'operation' is associated not with law, but
with the spheres of medicine and the military. In evoking the technical
expertise of surgical precision and military calculations, the Remarks
sidestep the range of legal categories that could have been usedexecution, extrajudicial killing, assassination, murder-categories that
bring to the surface a binary that Obama may have been attempting to
circumvent: legal/illegal.
Ironically, even as he avoids legal categories to characterize the U.S.
action, Obama relies on legal categories to characterize bin Laden:
enemy, terrorist, murderer, and violator of innocence. In selecting
"operation" to characterize the U.S. action, but "enemy," "terrorist," and
"murderer" to characterize bin Laden, it is as if the ordering and
signifying effects of law apply to bin Laden but not to the United States.
Augmenting this appropriative partitioning of law's applicability is the
quality of verdict in "murderer" and "terrorist" and of uncontroversial
Law of War clarity in the use of "enemy." The contrast between
"operation" and enemy/murderer/terrorist is thus a subtle (and
therefore especially powerful) construction of the United States as
global lawmaker and law-enforcer; the United States is empowered to
stand apart from the very law it scripts and relies on to condemn bin
Laden. Thus it is that from the opening lines of the Remarks onwards,
the long-standing myth of The Chosen Nation (discussed below) is

62. See EVE DARIAN-SMITH, LAWS AND SOCIETIES IN GLOBAL CONTEXTS 1-21 (2013), for
a recent, succinct, and thorough review of the literature. See generally ELIZABETH MERTZ,
THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A LAWYER" (2007), for a very
specific consideration of the manner in which legal education perpetuates legal positivism.
63. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 4 (1967).
64. See Remarks by the President, supra note 11 (characterizing the killing as "the
operation," "this operation," "a targeted operation," and twice as "an operation").
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invoked, with the United States implicitly claiming the ascendancy to
make and enforce a law that applies to others but not to itself.65
B. Enemy/Terrorist/Murderer
Law is inescapable, functioning as a scheme of interpretation in a
second vivid sense when bin Laden is rendered a legitimate target,
characterized,
simultaneously,
as
enemy/terrorist/murderer.
Additionally, while Obama is careful to avoid the brute oversimplification of George W. Bush's "evil," Obama's use of "innocent"66
inevitably (because it is a lexical item that engages binary oppositions) 67
positions the United States as 'innocent' and bin Laden as 'guilty.' As
part of this construction, because bin Laden's guilt is presented stripped
of context and cause,6 8 and because of the extreme nature of the 9/11
attacks and bin Laden's inflammatory language,69 the terrorism he
represents is excluded from a "view of terrorism as an expression of
social conflict reflecting comprehensible grievances (albeit not
necessarily justifiable)."70 With bin Laden cast as chief perpetrator of an
incomprehensible and extreme violence, the main identities of the
protagonists are cast: good/innocent Americans pitted against evil/guilty
terrorists.7 1
When bin Laden is characterized as enemy/terrorist/murderer as
well as violator of innocence, he is constructed as a threat in (at least)
four ways. 72 The confusion and contradictions that mark the U.S.
65. See Richard Falk, Encroaching on the Rule of Law: Post-9/11 Policies within the
United States, in NATIONAL INSECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEMOCRACIES DEBATE

COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 5, at 14, 20 (arguing that the construction of national
security as the primary concern of U.S. foreign policy, particularly during the
administration of George W. Bush, has been facilitated by recruiting neoconservative legal
specialists who typically "have a highly skeptical attitude about whether international law
should even be treated as real law").
66. See Remarks by the President, supra note 11 (describing bin Laden as "a terrorist
who's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children" and
"committed to killing innocents in our country").
67. See Esch, supra note 20, at 387-88, for a compendium of lexical items that
necessarily imply binary oppositions, carrying the opposite cognitive association, and
commonly used in the discourse of 9/11.
68. See Falk, supra note 65, at 24-25, for a discussion of the manner in which a refusal
to acknowledge, let alone address, grievances encourages the perception of "the terrorists
as evil extremists."
69. See id. at 16.
70. Brysk, supranote 5, at 4.
71. See JACKSON, supranote 6, at 18.
72. See Brysk, supra note 5, at 4-5 (arguing that this construction has foundational
implications for national security practices because the manner in which national security
is approached depends, in part, on the construction of the source and nature of the threat).
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response to 9/1173 are in keeping with this hyperbolic and totalizing
placement of bin Laden in all four categories of state responses to the
violence of nonstate actors: conventional war, unconventional war,
criminal violence, and, most troublingly, "as 'evildoers' beyond the scope
of human community . . . forfeit[ing] even the rights of enemies or

criminals." 74 The manner in which bin Laden was killed, in tandem with
his burial, speak to these forfeitures and prompt a multitude of
(unanswered) questions that go to the heart of legitimacy in a state's
exercise of coercive power.
III. TRANSLATING LAW'S AUTHORITY
A. Law's Authority: Before and After
If the Remarks construct a post-9/11 articulation of law's authority
and represent a departure from prior grounds, the question that must
be addressed is: what are these prior grounds? The intertextuality
inherent to language means that long-held understandings of 'rule of
law'-notions of legitimacy that predate modernity and are informed by
an assumption that 'law' cannot be severed from 'justice'-are imported
by, and incorporated into, contemporary understandings of law. 75 And if
'rule of law' is a concept and category that straddles 'law' and 'politics' to
represent legitimacy deriving from restraints on, and scrutiny of, state

73. See Falk, supra note 65, at 21-23.

74. Brysk, supra note 5, at 4.
75. The Drone Policy Speech offers a recent example of Obama's frequent references to
the Founding documents and Constitutional documents as sources of 'rule of law' and
'justice.' See Drone Policy Speech, supra note 24. For other similar references; see, for
example,
What is the Rule of Law?, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW,
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?articlejid=3 (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) ("Aristotle said
more than two thousand years ago, 'The rule of law is better than that of any
individual."'); TAMANAHA, supra note 21, at 25 (arguing that in the standard
historiography for 'rule of law' in the Anglo-American tradition, the 1215 Magna Carta is
often cited as an originary moment and stating that "[n]o discussion of the Medieval
origins of the rule of law would be complete without a mention of the Magna Carta");
David V. Stivison, Magna Carta in American Law, in MAGNA CARTA IN AMERICA 102, 10217 (David V. Stivison ed., 1993) (arguing that the continuing invocations of Aristotle and
the Magna Carta in contemporary 'rule of law' discourse highlights the legitimizing
resonance that attaches to Western antiquity, and highlights the role of narrative in
constructing 'rule of law' stories). It is something of an irony that while 'rule of law' is
commonly narrated as originating in classical Greek thought, this body of knowledge was
lost to 'the West' for an extensive period, and "rule of law as a continuous tradition took
root more than a thousand years after the heyday of Athens." TAMANAHA, supra note 21,
at 7.
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power,7 6 then the enduring presence of 'rule of law' in contemporary
formulations of law and legitimacy speaks to the impossibility of fencing
off the meanings of 'law,'77 whether across boundaries of time or
jurisdiction. In short, 'rule of law,' understood as including-as an
indispensible attribute-limits on state power, is inextricably linked to
the foundations of state legitimacy.7 8 This then is one crucial pillar of
pre-911 grounds for law's authority.7 9
In tandem with the intertextuality that imports long-held
understandings of 'law' into contemporary parameters for state
legitimacy is the centrality of narrative in constituting law's grounds of
authority. Ruth Buchanan and Sundhya Pahuja draw together the
strands of law, nation, narrative, and authority:
[Bloth law and nation first need to be understood in
terms of their peculiarly modern natures. And one key
shift that heralds modernity as a distinct period is, of
course, the loss of external foundations or what is
sometimes shorthanded as the 'death of God' . . .
provok[ing] a crisis of authority such that institutions in
modernity face the need to become self-founding . . .
posit[ing] their sources of authority within the modern
world (and often within themselves) rather than beyond
the world in some transcendent source. . . . Law and

nation each hold themselves out to be autonomous,
legitimate and authoritative. . . . [T]hey narrate, or
76. As a category, 'rule of law' is, of course, an essentially contested concept, see
generally Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)?,21 LAW AND PHIL. 137 (2002); and there is a vast literature explicating many
meanings for 'rule of law.' However, in keeping with my declared normative stance, which
sees the capacity to restrain state power as a crucial attribute of 'rule of law,' see generally
RAJAH, supra note 13, an attribute deeply embedded in Western legal traditions, see
generally CONSTABLE, supra note 10, and Western political traditions, see generally
LOUGHLIN, SUPRA NOTE 21, and drawing on the body of literature on rule of law referenced
above, see sources cited supra note 15, my argument proceeds on the basis that restraints
on, and scrutiny of, state power are a crucial aspect of 'rule of law.'
77. See, e.g., MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW
INDEX 2012-2013 (2012-2013), available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/
WJP Index Report_2012.pdf- Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Speech at Northwestern
University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opalag/
speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html (noting his astonishing reference to rule of law);
Niall Ferguson, The Rule of Law and its Enemies, THE REITH LECTURES (June 19, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/bOljmx0p.
78. See MVARGULIES, supranote 22.
79. The Drone Policy Speech repeatedly celebrates the role of restraints on state power
and visible, public processes, pillars the Drone Policy Speech perhaps seeks to restore. See
Drone Policy Speech, supra note 24.
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author [this authority] themselves. Law's narratives
assert that the law is what the law says it is. And
nations, too, must create themselves by narrating their
own stories of origin . . . .ao
In short, law in the modern, secular nation-state turns away from
transcendence as authority. Instead, it relies on the self-authoring, selfauthorizing narrative that ties law to that other self-authoring, selfauthorizing entity, nation. However, a paradox marks the narrative of
law, nation, and authority in the specific instance of the United States.
While, in keeping with the pattern Buchanan and Pahuja identify, law
and nation refer to each other and find authority in each other,8 1 there
is a subversion of secular modernity in one crucial respect: the narrative
of law, nation, and authority constructs the United States as itself
transcendent.
This transcendence is evident in the political myth of "The Chosen
Nation." 82 Briefly, political myth is "the work on a common narrative by
which the members of a social group (or society) . . . make significance of

their

experience

and

deeds," 83

providing

schemata for mapping the social world .

.

"fundamental cognitive

. [and thereby] reducing the

80. Ruth Buchanan & Sundhya Pahuja, Law, Nation and (Imagined) International
Communities, 8 L. TEXT CULTURE 137, 142 (2004).
81. Kramer discusses Derrida's critique of the American Declaration of Independence,
"where the fact of validating that noble document turns out to have rested all along on the
power that it supposedly generated." MATTHEW H. KRAMER, LEGAL THEORY, POLITICAL
THEORY, AND DECONSTRUCTION: AGAINST RHADAMANTHUS 120 (1991). Kramer translates
Derrida's critique,
Thus, there is the "good people" that engages itself and engages itself
only in signing itself, in signing its own declaration. The "we" of the
declaration speaks 'in the name of the people.'
But this people does not exist. It does not exist before this declaration .
... If it gives birth to itself as a free and independent subject, as a
possible signatory, that can hold only in (or with) the act of this
signature.
Id. at 121 (emphasis in original); see also MARGULIES, SUPRA NOTE 22, AT 19 ("The United
States is an intensely legalistic society and its reverence for the Constitution is almost
limitless.").
82. In referring to the myth of The Chosen Nation, I adopt Judis' and Hughes'
terminology. Jackson and Esch (following Jackson) perceive "The Chosen Nation" as an
expression of "American Exceptionalism." See generally JOHN B. JUDIs, THE FOLLY OF
EMPIRE: WHAT GEORGE W. BUSH COULD LEARN FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND
WOODROW WILSON (2004); RICHARD T. HUGHES, MYTHS AMERICA LIVES BY (2003);
JACKSON, supra note 6, at 35; SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1996); Esch, supra note 20.
83. BOTTICI, supra note 19, at 133.
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complexity of social life to the relative simplicity of its narrative plot." 84
Political myth meets the acute "need for a symbolic mediation of
political experience" generated by the "complexity of modern societies." 85
A key distinction between narrative and political myth is that political
myth is narrative that generates the affect of significance, creating a
sense of proximity, shared impact, and shared relevance between
individuals and nation; individuals and political events and experiences;
and individuals and other individuals who constitute the imagined
community of nation.
In addition to creating a sense of proximity and relevance between
events and narratives on the one hand, and the individual on the other,
some further key attributes of political myth are as follows: First, it
layers on top of narrative in a manner that reduces complexity; Second,
it is dynamic and interrelational, such that, in multiple sites, and
"borne within a web of relationships .

.

. it is continually (re)produced,

(re)interpreted, and (re)transmitted;"8 6 Third, political myth is richly
intertextual and efficient in that fragments, symbols, and words evoke
and recall "an entire body of work on a given myth .. . giv[ing] meaning
. . . beyond what is actually said;" 87 Fourth, political myth tends to
frame issues in such a manner that certain responses are precluded
while others are encouraged, typically in a manner that legitimizes
policy.8 8 Finally, and most potently, political myth tends to be
ubiquitous, invisible, and taken for granted, in part because these
myths have long been in existence and speak in imperceptible ways to a
group perception of political conditions and experiences.8 9
In locating political myth as a field, Chiara Bottici argues that
dominant thinking in contemporary political philosophy, as epitomized
by John Rawls' Theory of Justice and Jurgen Habermas' Between Facts
and Norms, proceeds on the assumption that when it comes to political
actors and the sphere of politics, "one can count on the rationality of the
actors involved" either as "rationality with regard to ends and values, or
as communicative rationality."9 0 Such an assumption risks failing to
account for a social reality in which "quite often, people seem to act on
the basis of arational elements,

. .

. powerful symbols and images of the

world, which are not taken into account by a purely rational image of
84. Id. at 179.
85. Id. at 132.
86. Esch, supra note 20, at 362. See also MARGULIES, supra note 22, at 5-41, for a
recent account of the deeply relational and socially pervasive nature of political myth in
the United States.
87. Esch, supra note 20, at 362-63.
88. See id. at 363.
89. See id. at 364.

90. BOTTICI, supra note 19, at 1 & n.1.
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politics."91 Given the pervasive, powerful, and either invisible or barely
visible workings of political myth, it is instructive to unpack the manner
in which the political myth of The Chosen Nation informs the Remarks.
The Chosen Nation is characterized by the sense that the United
States is "qualitatively different from other societies."92 A conviction in
an exceptional status and quality is not, of course, unique to the United
States as a nation. However, the United States is unique in history
because
America, unlike Britain, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet
Union, has yet to suffer a crushing setback to its hopes.
Over the last three centuries, America has steadily risen
in prosperity and power. As a result, successive
generations have passed on the belief that the United
States has a special role in the world.9 3
Augmenting this convergence of history and political myth is the
realpolitik of the United States' strategic global presence. When the
Remarks open with Obama reporting "to the American people and to the
world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed
Osama bin Laden," there is an awareness that U.S. action is alwaysalready global in impact. 94 In his assessment of the United States' post9/11 encroachments on the rule of law, Richard Falk highlights that the
confused and often unconvincing nature of U.S. responses to 9/11 is
crucially linked to the factor of the global:
[T]he specificities of the American situation . . . make it
a case apart . . . . [The U.S. is] the one and only global

state, with strategic interests and military deployments
spread around the entirety of the globe. In this respect
considerations other than counterterrorism became so
influential in shaping the American response to 9/11 as
to overwhelm the manifest security concerns raised by
even terrorist threats of unprecedented magnitude.9 5

91. Id. at 1.
92. Esch, supranote 20, at 366.
93. John B. Judis, The Author of Liberty: Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy, DISSENT,
Fall 2005, at 54, 56.
94. Remarks by the President, supra note 11 (emphasis added).This particular killing
most certainly played out in a global territorial theatre, with references to Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and the globe running throughout the Remarks. See id.
95. Falk, supranote 65, at 14.
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Political myth, history, and geo-politics layer upon the deeply
religious roots of the myth of The Chosen Nation 9 6-roots that remain
evident in the three main ideas of The Chosen Nation, "the idea of the
United States as God's 'chosen nation' . . . is the idea that the United
States has a 'mission' or a 'calling' to transform the world . . . [and] in

carrying out this mission, the United States is representing the forces of
good over evil."97
This mission-driven zeal of The Chosen Nation reverberates in the
United States-as-transcendent declarations with which the Remarks
end:
[T]oday's achievement [the killing of bin Laden] is a
testament to the greatness of our country and the
determination of the American people.

. .

. [W]e are once

again reminded that America can do whatever we set
our mind to. That is the story of our history, whether it's
the
pursuit of prosperity for our people, or the
struggle for equality for all our citizens; our commitment
to stand up for our values abroad, and our sacrifices to
make the world a safer place. . . . [W]e can do these

things not just because of wealth or power, but because
of who we are: one nation, under God, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all.9 8
In re-articulating The Chosen Nation by translating its long-held
ideas into a contemporary account, this excerpt illustrates how the
secular modernity of law/nation/authority is subverted: the killing of bin
Laden becomes an expression of U.S. national virtues in tandem with an
(implicit) erasure of 'law' when an extrajudicial, extraterritorial act of
state violence becomes emblematic of "the greatness of our country" in
96. See supra note 82.
97. JOHN B. JUDIS, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, THE CHOSEN NATION: THE
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1-2 (2005), available at http://carnegie
endowment.org/files/PB37.judis.FINAL.pdf.
98. Remarks by the President, supra note 11. This last phrase, the substantive closing
of the Remarks, repeats the closing line of the Pledge of Allegiance; appropriating longheld associations with patriotism for the act of killing bin Laden. In tracing the
contestations between a secularism drawn from Enlightenment thought, and religiousity
as a founding value of U.S. society, Margulies highlights the manner in which the last six
words of the Pledge of Allegiance, "with liberty and justice for all," written in 1892, reflect
Enlightenment values. In contrast, "under God" was a very recent addition; added in the
Cold War context of 1954 in an effort to distinguish the U.S. from the "godless
communism." See MARGULIES, supra note 22, at 24-25 (analyzing the relationship between
the Pledge of Allegiance and Enlightenment values).
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. equality for all

our citizens"), and the international arena ("our commitment to stand
up for our values abroad, and our sacrifices to make the world a safer
place"). By casting extraterritorial aggression as selfless, sacrificial, and
ethically motivated, the assertion is that such acts of violence are
(affectively, transcendentally) legitimate. The foundation of that
legitimacy is not national or international doctrinal law but the selfscripted ascendency of the United States as The Chosen Nation.
B. The Chosen Nation and Justice
If, in the Remarks, The Chosen Nation works to subvert law's
secular modernity, then this next section illustrates the manner in
which an amplification of affect translates 'justice' into a substitute for
'law.' Instead of secular modernity's standard narrative of
law/nation/authority,99
the
Remarks
narrate
The
Chosen
Nation/affective justice/United States as transcendent authority. This
subversion of secular modernity's law is especially evident in the way
the Remarks make (affective) sense of 9/11, when 'nation' becomes the
site of a significance that is simultaneously public yet intimate:
It was nearly 10 years ago that a bright September day
was
darkened by the worst attack on the American
people in our history. The images of 9/11 are seared into
our national memory-hijacked planes cutting through a
cloudless September sky; the Twin Towers collapsing to
the ground; black smoke billowing up from the
Pentagon; the wreckage of Flight 93 in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania, where the actions of heroic citizens saved
even more heartbreak and destruction.
The role of significance in political myth (rendering narrative
relevant, proximate, and felt), is overt when the 'nation' becomes one
traumatized body sharing one indelible national memory. This political
myth is constructed in language that heightens the senses of touch,
smell, sight, and sound and the affect of trauma, loss, and grief, with
the repeated harsh consonant 'k' (hijacked, cloudless, cutting)
underpinning the violence of that trauma.
When the narrative line moves from the public space of the iconic
images of 9/11 to the domestic spaces of nation, that which is private

99. See Buchanan and Pahuja, supra note 80.
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and unseen is again rendered into a shared affective experience, this
time even more intimately portrayed:
And yet we know that the worst images are those that
were unseen

.

. .

. The empty seat at the dinner table.

Children who were forced to grow up without their
mother or their father. Parents who would never know
the feeling of their child's embrace. Nearly 3,000 citizens
taken from us, leaving a gaping hole in our hearts.
The lexical chain "forced .

.

. never .

.

. taken," culminating in the

permanent "gaping hole in our heart," underlines the triple violence of
death, unforeseeable death, and unforeseeable death on a large scale.
The familial, very intimate, and domestic experiences of loss become
national (and nation making) when made to manifest in a civic
embodiment with a single punctured heart. In this way, the affect of
love, grief, and loss spans and yokes the sphere of both private and
public, such that the story of nation coheres around this felt, collectively
embodied, loss. 9/11 is (affectively) renewed and revitalized to become
the foundation of a 'justice' stripped of 'law.'
C. Affect, Nation, and Civic Community
The narrative arc of the Remarks shifts the nation from shock, grief,
and trauma to the celebration of an idealized civic community
presenting a shared affect of love and grief as the catalyst for this shift.
The shared love and grief rescues the nation from collapse and
galvanizes it into a healing unity. Transcending the barriers of
difference, 'family' becomes 'community' becomes 'nation':
On September 11, 2001, in our time of grief, the
American people came together. We offered our
neighbors a hand, and we offered the wounded our
blood. We reaffirmed our ties to each other and our love
of community and country. On that day, no matter
where we came from, what God we prayed to, or what
race or ethnicity we were, we were united as one
American family.
The centrality of affect in the Remarks continues with a
personification of the United States; vividly embodied as a single,
grieving, giving, sensing, body: extending a hand, sharing blood,
affirming ties, and feeling love. For this personified United States,
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images are seared into a single memory. Later in the Remarks, vigor is
reclaimed through a single mind, "America can do whatever we set our
mind to." Not only does 'family' become 'community' become 'nation,' the
circle of significance is closed with 'nation' becoming a single, sensing,
body; unified in its affective experience.
In narrating the unity of "one American family," Obama rehearses
a myth of American nationality that remains vital in our
political and cultural life: the idealized self-image of a
multiethnic, multiracial democracy, hospitable to
difference but united by a common sense of national
belonging.10 0
Indeed, as the first nonwhite President of the United States, Obama
embodies the promise and potential of this myth in an especially
poignant way. But this relatively recent mythology of the United States
as multiethnic and multiracial (Richard Slotkin dates it from the early
1940s 0 1) is in tension with an older, deeply entrenched, deeply raced
political myth of U.S. identity, the Myth of the Frontier.
[D]eveloped between 1780 and 1850, the myth depicts
America as a racial entity: a white Anglo-Saxon
Protestant nation, which defines itself by destroying or
subjugating a "non-white" enemy-Native Americans
and Mexicans. Although African Americans were part of
American society during this period, the myth treats
them as internal aliens, "others," and potential enemies
of "the white republic." In doing so, the myth reflects the
reality of an American society which had adopted a
"whites only" limitation of American citizenship.

.

. . The

central characters of the Frontier Myth represent
parties to a racial conflict, and the narrative action of
the myth tells us that such a conflict is inevitably
violent. Social relations among whites are always seen to
be based on mutual consent, and therefore democratic;
but whites can deal with Indians only through force, by
exterminating or subjugating them-that is, ruling them
by force, without their consent. I call this concept the

100. Richard Slotkin,

Unit Pride: Ethnic Platoons and the Myths of American

Nationality, 13 AM. LITERARY HIST. 469, 469 (2001).
101. See id.
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"savage war" myth, and it is an aspect of the Frontier
Myth . . . .102
Through an analysis of myth, race, and nation in the genre of
combat films, Slotkin argues that, in life as on screen, the enemy as
dehumanized, savage, and racial Other becomes the narrative trope
that enables the United States, as nation, to "put difference aside and
work together against an enemy who is both evil and overwhelmingly
powerful."10 3
The unresolved tension between these competing myths of U.S.
identity-multiethnic civic community10 4 versus whites-only Frontier
Myth-is marked by a near-absence in the Remarks. 0 5 In his idealized
picture of "love of community and country," Obama chooses to minimally
acknowledge (in a peripheral mention toward the end of the Remarks) 06
the post-9/11 violence directed, within the United States, at a raced
category: "persons who appear to be 'Middle Eastern, Arab, or
Muslim'." 0 7
Leti Volpp points out that U.S. state policy and practice has played
a role in the more than one thousand incidents of violence, which
occurred within just a year of 9/11, directed at those who belong to this
post-9/11 identity category.10 8 Though this violence was perpetrated by
"the general public," 09 Volpp sees this aggression as expressions of the
race-related governmentality formulated and enacted by the U.S. state
in response to 9/11,
In simultaneously advocating policies of color blindness
for citizenry while engaging in racial profiling for
noncitizens, and publicly embracing all religions, while
particularly privileging Christianity, the administration
has, in the name of democratic inclusion, disingenuously
excluded. That an epidemic of hate violence has occurred
102. Id. at 473.
103. Id. at 479.
104. Smith traces the consolidation of ideologies marginalizing the already
marginalized, such as women, non-whites, and the poor, to the Progressive Era (18981912). ROGERS SMITH, CIVIL IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 410-420 (1997).

105. See id. passim.
106. Toward the closing of the Remarks, Obama acknowledges that, "the sense of unity
that prevailed on 9/11 . . . has, at times, frayed." Remarks by the President, supra note 11.
107. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, in SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY 147, 147
(Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 149.
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within the context of "private" relations thus does not
mean that such violence is without "public" origins or
consequences. 110
In highlighting the manner in which this post-9/11 identity category
has resulted in a fracturing of civic community, "members of this group
have been identified as terrorists, and disidentified as citizens."'
Volpp's essay may be read as a counter-narrative to the idealized
multiethnic harmony constructed by the Remarks. This vulnerability to
being disidentified as 'citizen' has, as Volpp points out, disturbing
precedent in the United States' internment of Japanese citizens during
World War II, and significantly, was not an outcome of the Oklahoma
City bombing:
Timothy McVeigh failed to produce a discourse about
good whites and bad whites, because the public
conceptualized McVeigh as an individual deviant ....
His actions were not considered representative of an
entire racial group. This is ...

how racial subordination

functions: to understand nonwhites as directed
group-based determinism but to see whites
individuals. 112

by
as

The contrast is striking. By refusing to conceive of bin Laden as a
deviant individual and, instead, fostering systemic racial profiling, the
deep undercurrents of the Myth of the Frontier (necessitating savage
war against a fully dehumanized enemy), might be seen to be at work.113
The enduring resonance of this aspect of U.S. political myth is one way
of explaining both the propensity to racialized exclusions from 'nation'
that Volpp traces and the widespread acceptance within the United
States for the manner in which bin Laden was killed and buried. Most
crucially, the continuing significance of the Myth of the Frontier
explains how violence directed at the dehumanized, savage, racially
Other enemy' 1 4 serves the transcendence of the United States in two
senses. First, this violence is in continuity with long-entrenched
understandings of a 'justice' that has no need for the institutions,
processes, and actors of secular modernity's law; and second, this
violence is 'just' also because it consolidates the 'nation,' healing
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 151.
See Slotkin, supra note 100.
See id. at 479.
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internal fractures by casting a shared affective significance of U.S.
political experience as the transcendent value.

D. Civic Versus Global Communities
If the one and only global nation needs an external enemy to heal
the internal fractures of 'nation,' then the political myth of The Chosen
Nation accounts for the manner in which 9/11 could not be permitted to
be framed in transnational terms. Instead, The Chosen Nation took
expression in its (perhaps unexpected) variation of exceptional victim. 115
In emphasizing American ownership and experience of the tragedy
and trauma of 9/11 ("Nearly 3,000 citizens taken from us"), the Remarks
are consistent with prior U.S. official rhetoric in choosing not to frame
the events in a manner that might build a transnational and humanist
solidarity:
[Official rhetoric overwhelmingly depicted Americans as
a special, united people suffering a uniquely obscene
tragedy. Alternatively, the rhetoric could have framed
the events as an attack on humanity or expressed
solidarity with victims of political violence in other
countries. However, through continual emphasis of
American ownership of the tragedy, the official rhetoric
succeeded in bestowing upon America the politically
valuable status of primary victim. As Bowman has
pointed out, creating or sustaining a sense of national
victimhood and grievance promotes a discourse of
violence that rallies support for war.

. .

. [I]t serve[s a]

political purpose.116
Thus, while it may seem hopelessly contradictory for the political
myths at work to simultaneously construct The Chosen Nation in terms
of superiority as well as in terms of victimhood, the underlying rationale
is coherent: American suffering is qualitatively different from the
suffering of non-Americans. Implicitly, the suffering of America as
nation, and Americans as citizens, becomes the authority for departing
from law, turning instead to a justice founded in the affect of grief.
In her poignant response to 9/11, novelist Barbara Kingsolver
recounts moments of natural calamity and political violence that have
killed thousands in horrifically condensed moments and, tellingly,
115. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 35 (characterizing this as "Exceptional Grievance").
116. Esch, supra note 20, at 373 (internal citations omitted).
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reminds readers that, three and a half years after the Japanese
bombing of Pearl Harbor, "American planes bombed a plaza in Japan
where men and women were going to work, where schoolchildren were
playing, and more humans died at once than anyone thought possible.
Seventy thousand in a minute. Imagine."117
I draw attention to Kingsolver's piece, not because I want to
quantify violence in terms of body counts, but because it conveys, so
powerfully, the manner in which the discourse of the exceptional victim
expresses, in a different thematic form, the myth of The Chosen Nation.
In treating America, and American suffering as qualitatively different
from other peoples in other places, The Chosen Nation is expressed
anew in the form of an apartness: apart both from the rest of the world
and from (relatively recent) historic events. Isolationism and the
exaltation of the United States (even if it is the exaltation of pain) go
hand-in-hand and return us to Bottici's emphasis on the role of
significance in the processes of reproducing and reformulating political
myths. New events and circumstances may generate variations on the
theme of The Chosen Nation, 1 8 but the logic of indifference to that
which occurs in not-America, to not-Americans, remains. 119
IV. HEALING THE (CHOSEN) NATION: NARRATING JUSTICE

With the insistence that the American people are united, loving, and
neighborly, the killing of bin Laden becomes an opportunity to renarrate the nation, minimizing the fractures of racialized public and
private violence such that nation, as loving community, becomes a
healing trope. After all, "[c]onstructing a memory involves forgetting.
Creating the narrative structure of a memory requires us to choose
what to place in the story, and what to leave out."120 Obama's decision to
almost completely leave out the post-9/11 failures of 'citizen' is
consistent with "the attempt by nationalist discourses persistently to
117. Barbara Kingsolver, A Pure, High Note of Anguish, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at
M8.
118. Perhaps the events of the Boston bombings, as they have come to be known, offer a
recent example, particularly in the extraordinary inflation of the language of "weapons of
mass destruction" used in the charge. In addition to establishing a lexical and rhetorical
link to Saddam Hussein, the use of "weapons of mass destruction" raises the following
question: if home-made pressure cooker bombs are "weapons of mass destruction," what
then does nuclear weaponry become?
119. One very troubling and on-going expression of this aspect of The Chosen Nation is
evident in the official and popular justifications relating to the use of drones in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.
120. Mary L. Dudziak, Afterword: Remembering September 11, in SEPTEMBER 11 IN
HISTORY, supra note 111, at 212, 213.

136

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 21:1

produce the idea of the nation as a continuous narrative of national
progress, the narcissism of self-generation, the primeval present of the
Volk."121

This narration of nation is also significant in terms of narrating
'justice' into being when Obama moves from recounting the healing
nation to a cause-and-effect narrative of a justified war, ("The American
people did not choose this fight. It came to our shores, and started with
the senseless slaughter of our citizens"); a war embarked upon to protect
those who matter, "our citizens, our friends, and our allies."
In directing the narrative from the motif of healing and civic
community to the attainment of justice, the Remarks present a
particular subset of social actors as key: military, intelligence, and
counterterrorism personnel. If the military has long been understood to
be "the instrument of American patriotism,"122 the manner in which the
categories 'counterterrorism professionals' and 'intelligence community'
are situated alongside the military is surely significant. The term 'spies'
is not used, but it lurks beneath the surface of 'counterterrorism
professionals' and 'intelligence community.' In celebrating those who
work in counterterrorism and intelligence, the Remarks firmly relocate
'spies' from the shadowy realm of deception and treachery to the
valorized realm of the heroic and virtuous. There is no
acknowledgement of the shame and scandal attaching to the horrific
abuses of (military, intelligence, and counterterrorism) power invoked
by names like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.123 In this movement and
redefinition with regard to the cast of justice actors, we see yet another
mode of translation at work; a mode of translation which moves actors
and redefines their roles, as explicated by Callon. 124

121. Homi K. Bhabha, Introduction:Narratingthe Nation, in NATION AND NARRATION 1,
1 (Homi K. Bhabha ed.,1990) (emphasis omitted).
122. Slotkin, supra note 100, at 477.
123. In contrast, it is noteworthy that, in the Drone Policy Speech, Obama seeks to
implicitly distinguish the conduct of the Bush Presidency, which "us[ed] torture to
interrogate our enemies, and detain[ed] individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule
of law," from the strategies of his administration, which has "unequivocally banned
torture, affirmed our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our policies with the
rule of law, and expanded our consultations with Congress." Drone Policy Speech, supra
note 24. Toward the end of the Drone Policy Speech, he asserts "we commit to a process of
closing GTMO .. . consistent with our commitment to the rule of law." Id.

124. Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the
Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND BELIEF: A NEW
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE? 196-223 (John Law ed. 1986). I am grateful to Cohn Ford for
this invaluable reference and for access to Ford's Dungeons and Dragons: Controversy,
Translation, and Occult Gaming (copy on file with author), which applies Callon's
argument in an illuminating and engaging manner.
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If 'law' and 'rule of law' are terms that represent state power that is
visible, scrutinized, and accountable, then a shift in the parameters of
legitimacy is effected when those who work in the hidden worlds of
counterterrorism and intelligence are publicly celebrated, even as their
exclusion from public scrutiny is cast as an expression of individual and
national virtue. The Remarks repeatedly celebrate military,
counterterrorism, and intelligence personnel for work that is tireless,
heroic, painstaking, courageous, skillful, professional, patriotic, and
self-sacrificing. The sacralizing language with which this new cast of
justice actors (and their work) is constructed provides an authority for
'justice' that returns the foundations of that authority to 'nation.'
However, very specifically, the 'justice' constructed by the Remarks does
not situate justice's authority in the secular, modern nation-state.
Instead, the Remarks bring 'justice' into being by relying on The Chosen
Nation, reinscribing, as we have seen, the United States as itself
transcendent:
Tonight, we give thanks to the countless intelligence and
counterterrorism professionals who've worked tirelessly
to achieve

this outcome.

.

. . We give thanks for the

men who carried out this operation, for they exemplify
the professionalism, patriotism, and unparalleled
courage of those who serve our country. . . . [W]e are: one

nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice
for all. .

.

. May God bless you. And may God bless the

United States of America.
Importantly, this sacralizing of the United States, and of the
personnel who serve America-the military, intelligence and
counterterrorism personnel-again deploys affect (determination,
sacrifice, courage, patriotism, service) within a rhetorical framework
that recalls the cadence of a (Christian) sermon. This sacralizing
language elevates the new justice actors to a space beyond scrutiny or
knowability. They are invisible because of the (virtuous and selfsacrificing) nature of their work, and the justification for this invisibility
is experienced as a feeling and in the manifestation of justice: "The
American people do not see their work, nor know their names. But
tonight, they feel the satisfaction of their work and the result of their
pursuit of justice." 125
In short, 'justice' is authorized by shared feelings; an affective
conviction in the United States as transcendent. In the process, what is
125. Remarks by the President, supranote 11.
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toppled is a secular law. If law, in particular 'rule of law,' scrutinizes
power, values transparency, and seeks clarity as to normative content,
then 'justice' in the post-9/11 world of the Remarks resides in the
production (and disposal) of dead bodies and in feelings that are
bordered as American in ideological, territorial, and profoundly mythic
terms.
V. CONCLUSION: RECOVERING THE 'LAW' IN'LEGITIMACY'

If language and conduct embody the rules and values that are law,
then a major announcement like the Remarks cannot be dismissed as
the empty rhetoric of a politician, nor can the manner in which bin
Laden was killed be minimized as an exception. Law is embodied and
enacted by the text of the Remarks and the text of this killing. It is a
law that has uncoupled 'law' and 'justice,' celebrating secretive state
actors and elevating an extra-judicial killing into an emblem of national
virtue and international ascendancy. Together, the killing of bin Laden
and the text of the Remarks have reconfigured the very grounds of state
legitimacy.
And yet the violations of 'law' and legitimacy of this reconfiguration
are not immediately apparent, and this is where translation has played
a major role. A strategic disaggregation-a bifurcated translation-has
enabled the performance of legitimacy through the affect of gesture,
image, sound, and significance, even as norms, actors, roles, and
systems have been reconfigured, moved, and re-defined. The discarding
of established legal and judicial processes is barely noticeable when we
are wrapped in a womb-like affect of significance designed to climax in a
felt and retributive 'justice.' This felt justice becomes the grounds of a
legitimacy that celebrates U.S. political myth as an authorizing and
legitimizing transcendence that has no need for transparency, the
scrutiny of power, or visible public processes. The abandonment of the
'law' of secular modernity pales into insignificance when paired with the
ample and seductive affect of political myth.
This translation is all the more sinister because it is coherent with a
range of ways in which U.S. state power continues to be exercised in a
post-9/11 world in which torture, detention without trial, and extrajudicial killings have come to be normalized as long as these occur in
distant places upon the bodies of distant Others. If a crucial attribute of
'rule of law' is contained in the fragile crucible of law's capacity to strive
for an apartness from power and to use this (notionally) separate
standing to scrutinize and limit power through institutions, processes,
and actors who are visible and public, then recognizing the operations of
translation may help alert us to ways in which conceptions of state
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legitimacy are uncoupling 'law' and 'justice,' even as perceptions of that
legitimacy rely on sinister translations.
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APPENDIX A: REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON OSAMA BIN LADEN

Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 02, 2011
Remarks by the President on Osama Bin Laden
East Room
11:35 P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. Tonight, I can report to the
American people and to the world that the United States has conducted
an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a
terrorist who's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men,
women, and children.
It was nearly 10 years ago that a bright September day was
darkened by the worst attack on the American people in our history.
The images of 9/11 are seared into our national memory-hijacked
planes cutting through a cloudless September sky; the Twin Towers
collapsing to the ground; black smoke billowing up from the Pentagon;
the wreckage of Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, where the
actions of heroic citizens saved even more heartbreak and destruction.
And yet we know that the worst images are those that were unseen
to the world. The empty seat at the dinner table. Children who were
forced to grow up without their mother or their father. Parents who
would never know the feeling of their child's embrace. Nearly 3,000
citizens taken from us, leaving a gaping hole in our hearts.
On September 11, 2001, in our time of grief, the American people
came together. We offered our neighbors a hand, and we offered the
wounded our blood. We reaffirmed our ties to each other, and our love of
community and country. On that day, no matter where we came from,
what God we prayed to, or what race or ethnicity we were, we were
united as one American family.
We were also united in our resolve to protect our nation and to bring
those who committed this vicious attack to justice. We quickly learned
that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by al Qaeda-an organization
headed by Osama bin Laden, which had openly declared war on the
United States and was committed to killing innocents in our country
and around the globe. And so we went to war against al Qaeda to
protect our citizens, our friends, and our allies.
Over the last 10 years, thanks to the tireless and heroic work of our
military and our counterterrorism professionals, we've made great
strides in that effort. We've disrupted terrorist attacks and
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strengthened our homeland defense. In Afghanistan, we removed the
Taliban government, which had given bin Laden and al Qaeda safe
haven and support. And around the globe, we worked with our friends
and allies to capture or kill scores of al Qaeda terrorists, including
several who were a part of the 9/11 plot.
Yet Osama bin Laden avoided capture and escaped across the
Afghan border into Pakistan. Meanwhile, al Qaeda continued to operate
from along that border and operate through its affiliates across the
world.
And so shortly after taking office, I directed Leon Panetta, the
director of the CIA, to make the killing or capture of bin Laden the top
priority of our war against al Qaeda, even as we continued our broader
efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat his network.
Then, last August, after years of painstaking work by our
intelligence community, I was briefed on a possible lead to bin Laden. It
was far from certain, and it took many months to run this thread to
ground. I met repeatedly with my national security team as we
developed more information about the possibility that we had located
bin Laden hiding within a compound deep inside of Pakistan. And
finally, last week, I determined that we had enough intelligence to take
action, and authorized an operation to get Osama bin Laden and bring
him to justice.
Today, at my direction, the United States launched a targeted
operation against that compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. A small team
of Americans carried out the operation with extraordinary courage and
capability. No Americans were harmed. They took care to avoid civilian
casualties. After a firefight, they killed Osama bin Laden and took
custody of his body.
For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda's leader and
symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our
friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant
achievement to date in our nation's effort to defeat al Qaeda.
Yet his death does not mark the end of our effort. There's no doubt
that al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks against us. We must-and
we will-remain vigilant at home and abroad.
As we do, we must also reaffirm that the United States is not-and
never will be-at war with Islam. I've made clear, just as President
Bush did shortly after 9/11, that our war is not against Islam. Bin
Laden was not a Muslim leader; he was a mass murderer of Muslims.
Indeed, al Qaeda has slaughtered scores of Muslims in many countries,
including our own. So his demise should be welcomed by all who believe
in peace and human dignity.
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Over the years, I've repeatedly made clear that we would take
action within Pakistan if we knew where bin Laden was. That is what
we've done. But it's important to note that our counterterrorism
cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the
compound where he was hiding. Indeed, bin Laden had declared war
against Pakistan as well, and ordered attacks against the Pakistani
people.
Tonight, I called President Zardari, and my team has also spoken
with their Pakistani counterparts. They agree that this is a good and
historic day for both of our nations. And going forward, it is essential
that Pakistan continue to join us in the fight against al Qaeda and its
affiliates.
The American people did not choose this fight. It came to our shores,
and started with the senseless slaughter of our citizens. After nearly 10
years of service, struggle, and sacrifice, we know well the costs of war.
These efforts weigh on me every time I, as Commander-in-Chief, have to
sign a letter to a family that has lost a loved one, or look into the eyes of
a service member who's been gravely wounded.
So Americans understand the costs of war. Yet as a country, we will
never tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our
people have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our citizens
and our friends and allies. We will be true to the values that make us
who we are. And on nights like this one, we can say to those families
who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda's terror: Justice has been done.
Tonight, we give thanks to the countless intelligence and
counterterrorism professionals who've worked tirelessly to achieve this
outcome. The American people do not see their work, nor know their
names. But tonight, they feel the satisfaction of their work and the
result of their pursuit of justice.
We give thanks for the men who carried out this operation, for they
exemplify the professionalism, patriotism, and unparalleled courage of
those who serve our country. And they are part of a generation that has
borne the heaviest share of the burden since that September day.
Finally, let me say to the families who lost loved ones on 9/11 that
we have never forgotten your loss, nor wavered in our commitment to
see that we do whatever it takes to prevent another attack on our
shores.
And tonight, let us think back to the sense of unity that prevailed on
9/11. I know that it has, at times, frayed. Yet today's achievement is a
testament to the greatness of our country and the determination of the
American people.
The cause of securing our country is not complete. But tonight, we
are once again reminded that America can do whatever we set our mind
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to. That is the story of our history, whether it's the pursuit of prosperity
for our people, or the struggle for equality for all our citizens; our
commitment to stand up for our values abroad, and our sacrifices to
make the world a safer place.
Let us remember that we can do these things not just because of
wealth or power, but because of who we are: one nation, under God,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
Thank you. May God bless you. And may God bless the United
States of America.
END 11:44 P.M. EDT

